Introduction
In this paper we want to investigate the di®erent e®ects that the introduction of a Leniency Program % can have on both¯rms' behaviour and deterrence. Our work is related to other papers on the optimal enforcement of law, speci¯cally those on pre{trial negotiation and settlement & and on plea{bargaining ' , in which these alternative judicial procedures have been studied with a general reference to the US judicial system, although not explicitly to antitrust law.
There are however several important di®erences between our work and the existing literature. The papers on pre{trial negotiation have considered mainly the properties of these procedures in saving trial costs preventing wasteful litigation. In the plea bargaining literature the enforcer acts more explicitly on behalf of taxpayers, balancing the goal of condemning the guilty agents and not condemning the innocent ones with the minimization of resources devoted to enforcement. In both cases, the issue of deterrence is not really addressed: agents have (possibly) already committed a crime, and in most papers, whether the agent is innocent or guilty and how strong is the evidence against him (agent's type) is exogenous in the model, and it is not explained in terms of incentives to commit a crime. The e®ects of the legal procedures on preventing the crime or making it to cease are instead at the center of our analysis.
In our paper we are mainly concerned with the deterrence and desistence properties of negotiations between the Antitrust Authority and private¯rms. The enforcer is motivated by the maximization of social welfare and aims at minimizing the occurrence of collusion among¯rms by committing on a certain set of policy parameters . In order to focus on deterrence, in our setting we exclude other ingredients already studied in the literature. First of all we do not consider (variable) litigation costs on either party, a central issue in the pre{trial negotiation literature. The enforcer's budget is set at the beginning of the game and enforcement costs are sunk, i.e. they are already allocated among the di®erent tasks of the organization, as general monitoring or prosecution. Secondly, we do not consider the possibility of wrong sentences, analyzed in the plea{bargaining papers: at the end of an investigation either a guilty¯rm is condemned or no evidence is reached.
In this setting we consider several issues. First of all we analyze the reaction of¯rms to di®erent policy regimes, i.e. on the incentive to collude and on the decision to reveal or not information to the Antitrust Authority. A perverse e®ect can arise under this respect: since a Leniency Program allows rms to pay reduced¯nes, it may have ex-ante a pro{collusive e®ect, decreasing the expected cost of anticompetitive behaviour. But we show that, if the Antitrust Authority has limited resources, and is therefore unable to prevent collusion ex{ante, the use of Leniency Programs can improve the e®ectiveness of the policy, by sharply increasing the probability of interrupting collusive practices. Hence, in a second best perspective,¯ne reductions may be desirable because they allow to better implement ex{post desistence from collusion.
There is however a third component that operates in equilibrium: in order to induce¯rms to reveal, a Leniency Program has to commit resources to guarantee a su±ciently high probability of independent prosecution. This is the implicit cost of a reduced¯nes regime, since those resources are subtracted from the general monitoring activity, which determines the frequency of \revelations" and successful inquiries. As the resources committed to prosecution become too costly, a Leniency Program loses its appeal, and a full¯nes regime may become more convenient again. The conditions under which these results hold will be identi¯ed in both a homogeneous and a heterogeneous cartel setting. The e®ects and desirability of alternative leniency rules will also be studied.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic model, in which every¯rm which decides to cooperate with the Antitrust Authority is given a¯ne reduction. In section 3 we consider alternative Leniency Programs, in which¯ne reductions can be granted only if cooperation occurs before an investigation is opened, or in which only the¯rst comer, or a speci¯c¯rm, is entitled to a reduced¯ne. Finally, in section 4 we extend the basic model to the heterogeneous cartels case. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
Throughout the paper, we assume that the Antitrust Authority (AA from now on) aims at maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function and is able to commit to a certain set of policy parameters , which consist of full and reduced monetary¯nes and probabilities of enforcement. In the basic model of this section we consider a regime in which all¯rms which cooperate in the investigation even after this has been opened, and which simultaneously provide useful evidence to prove collusion , can bene¯t from a reduction in¯nes. In the following sections we shall consider alternative rules and compare them with this benchmark case.
The AA is (exogenously) endowed with a per{period budget *: in line with the literature, we assume that setting the¯nes at any level is not costly, while increasing the probability of enforcement requires resources. More precisely, we assume that the maximum¯ne that¯rms can receive if found guilty of collusion is exogenously given by law and equal to ., a¯xed amount of money: then, being costless, it is always optimal to set the full¯ne at this maximum level. However, the AA can commit to a Leniency Program which allows for reduced¯nes 4 · . to¯rms which reveal information useful to prove the existence of collusion. Indirectly, that is via the allocation of its given resources among di®erent tasks, the AA determines the probability ® of opening an investigation and the probability p of proving¯rms guilty. The former refers to the preliminary activities (general monitoring) necessary to open an investigation such as collecting information about the¯rms in the industry, interviewinḡ rms, suppliers and customers, collecting data from the di®erent sources; the latter (prosecution) involves collecting further more focused information on the case, ordering surprise \raids" in thē rms' headquarters, processing the information collected and preparing the case against the¯rms according to the existing laws. The AA, allocating resources to these two groups of tasks can obtain a combinations of these probabilities according to their speci¯c production functions ! . The budget This is in line with actual experience, in which little discretion is left by the law to the Authority as to the conditions under which reductions can be given, and their amount.
Throughout the paper, we assume that information given by a single¯rm is enough to prove that all the¯rms which have taken part in the collusion are guilty. This might be interpreted as the case where each¯rm has access to the minutes of the meetings which take place among all the colluding¯rms, or has copies of letters, faxes or e{mail messages which all the¯rms have used to coordinate on the collusive outcome. Since an important component in the working of cartels is the coordination of moves among participants, the access of each partner to some information regarding the others seems quite realistic.
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More precisely, let the AA budget constraint be B = w(l® +lp); where B is the total budget available to the Authority; l® the number of hours allocated to general monitoring and lp those devoted to prosecution, w the wage rate. In turn, the probabilites are determined given the resources according to the production functions ® = k®l, and p = kpl, with ® ! constraint is then:
where w ® and w p are the (constant) unit cost of monitoring and prosecution. We assume that¯rms know the probabilities ® and p chosen by the AA and its budget constraint.
The AA objective function is a standard utilitarian welfare function, i.e. the sum of producers and consumers surplus. Fines, whether full or reduced, are pure transfers, i.e. they go to the general government budget and are redistributed to consumers without distortions, and cannot be used by the AA to increase its budget. The agency problem can therefore be described as choosing the incentive scheme (R; ®; p) in order to in°uence¯rms' behaviour and maximize social welfare. The incentive compatibility constraints will be derived from the analysis of the subgame perfect equilibria in the supergame played by¯rms once the policy parameters are set. After observing the policy parameters chosen by the AA, n identical¯rms decide whether to collude or not, by correctly taking into account the probabilities (®; p) and by knowing whether a Leniency Program R is in place or not.
We follow the usual supergame literature and consider the incentive of each¯rm to play an action which leads to the collusive outcome given that all other¯rms take the collusive action. If ā rm deviates it earns a pro¯t ¦ D in the current period but it triggers the punishment of the other rms, which will play the one{shot non{cooperative equilibrium action forever afterwards, by giving the deviating¯rm a total discounted payo® of ¦ D + ±¦ N =(1 ¡ ±). If instead the¯rm decides to take the collusive action, then it earns a payo® of ¦ M (with ¦ N < ¦ M < ¦ D ) in the current period.
We assume that the existence of a collusive outcome in the industry is perfectly observed by the antitrust agency, but this is not enough for collusion to be proved in courts. To be able to build a case against the¯rms (which would otherwise win the appeal in a Court), the AA needs to¯nd some \hard" information about collusion. Such information might consist of any document proving that¯rms have agreed on prices or have met to coordinate on the prices to be charged " . Perfect observability of collusive prices also implies that the antitrust agency will never open an investigation on¯rms which do not collude at equilibrium.
For simplicity we consider the case where¯rms decide once and for all at the initial period whether to collude or to deviate from the projected cartel # . From our discussion so far, the timing of the game, represented in Figure 1 , is as follows:
and p [0; 1], characterized for simplicity by positive and constant marginal productivity. Then the labor requirement to obtain ® and p are l® (®) = ®=k® and lp(p) = p=kp respectively and the total cost of implementing ® and p are wl ® (®) = w®=k ® = w ® ® and wl p (p) = wp=k p = w p p. It will be clear in the analysis that assuming decreasing marginal productivity, which would imply a concave budget line and a convex budget set, would not alter all our conclusions. "
To this purpose, note that in our model, like any repeated game with an in¯nite horizon, there exists a continuum of possible equilibria, and¯rms need some coordination to select the fully collusive outcome giving them the per{period pro¯t ¦M .
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In our setting, this is not a completely innocent assumption since the game becomes stationary only after the initial period, once¯rms have started colluding: considering the choice of deviating for any t > 1 is equivalent, since in this case¯rms, having participated for some periods to a cartel, pay an expected¯ne even if they deviate later on. When deviating initially, on the contrary, a¯rm can avoid the¯ne, since it never participated to the illegal agreement. However, notice that for this reason a deviation at the beginning is more attractive than breaking down the cartel later on, and the associated constraints are more stringent. Since the alternative case makes the analysis more complex but gives the same qualitative results, we have preferred to keep the simplest version where¯rms decide only at t = 1 whether to deviate or collude. t = 0 The Antitrust Authority determines the policy parameters R; ®; p, which are observed by all rms. The reduced¯ne R is granted to any¯rm cooperating even after the investigation is opened. t = 1 Firms i = 1; ::; n decide whether to collude or deviate and realize the per{period associated payo®. t = 2 The AA opens an investigation with probability ® 2 [0; 1] . If the inquiry is not opened, each rm realizes the per{period pro¯ts associated to the previous choice. If the investigation starts, rms simultaneously decide whether to reveal information that the AA will¯nd useful to prove collusion; if at least one¯rm reveals, the AA is able to prove them guilty. The¯rm(s) which cooperated with the AA pays R · F while the others pay the full¯ne F . If no¯rm reveals, the AA is able to prove them guilty with probability p 2 [0; 1] . If the AA has not been able to prove the¯rms guilty of collusion at the end of this inquiry, the¯rms will never be investigated again in the future. If proved guilty, they will behave non{cooperatively forever in the future. We can now solve for the equilibrium of this game. Our¯rst step is to identify the incentive compatibility constraints, which requires to work out, for given policy parameters, the subgame perfect equilibria of the game starting at t = 1, characterized by¯rms colluding or deviating and by the choice of revealing or not information to the AA. We¯rst consider the \revelation game" which is played from t = 2 on if an investigation is opened by the AA. The following Lemma identi¯es the conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in which¯rms cooperate or not with the AA.
Lemma 1 Let
Provided that an investigation has been opened, in the \revelation" game an equilibrium always exists in which all¯rms reveal information. if an investigation has been opened by the AA. To the left of it, they do not. This curve, which always passes through the upper right corner of the picture, rotates to the left as the reward from revealing information increases (that is, the lower R) and the larger becomes the¯ne F to be paid if found guilty: in other words, revelation occurs for a wider set of parameters as the incentive to cooperate with the AA is sharpened.
We can now consider the initial decision to join the proposed agreement or deviate at t=1.
Three possible outcomes can occur:¯rms might prefer not to collude (N C), since they expect an immediate deviation. Alternatively, collusion may start, followed by the decision not to reveal (CN R) or to reveal (CR) if an investigation is opened by the AA. To simplify the statement of the results, it is convenient to introduce the following expressions. ± NC (®; p; F ) is the value which solves:
while ± CR (®; R) is:
The following proposition identi¯es the conditions on the discount factor ± for the three outcomes Note also that the more generous the Leniency Program (the lower the reduced¯ne R) the lower ± CR : if¯rms expect that in case an investigation is opened they have the possibility to reveal information and get away with a small¯ne, this will give an incentive to choose the collusive strategy.
In other words, a generous Leniency Policy might stimulate ex{ante collusion. below ± CR they prefer not to collude and above they initially collude and then reveal if monitored.
We can notice that the conditions for collusion are more demanding with respect to the standard case when no AA operates: the critical discount factor needed for a collusive outcome is always higher than (¦ D ¡¦ M )=(¦ D ¡¦ N ) when ® and p are positive. When a¯rm considers whether to join a cartel or deviate, in fact, it evaluates the collusive pro¯ts taking into account that with a certain probability collusion will be detected, inducing a double loss: the¯ne to be paid and the lost collusive pro¯ts from there on. The higher the probability of these losses, the lower the collusive pro¯ts. Hence, we need a higher and higher discount factor to balance the temptation to deviate. On the other hand, there exists an area (2) where collusion will break down (because the¯rms reveal information) if the AA starts monitoring the industry (CR), whereas in the absence of a Leniency Program collusion could stop only after a successful complete investigation (CNR). This is the area comprised between the dotted part of the curve ± NC and the curve±. $ .
We can now move to the analysis of the optimal policy, having identi¯ed the implementable allocations. So far we have expressed the conditions for the di®erent equilibrium outcomes in the $ If the Leniency Program were unanticipated,¯rms would decide whether to collude or not on the basis of an expected ne R = F and therefore would not cooperate unless ±¸± NC . When the leniency program is introduced unexpectedly, collusion would break down in all the area below the curve± (that is, (1) plus (2)), without any adverse e®ect arising. % space (p; ±): this was useful because we obtained the conditions of cartel stability in terms of critical discount factors, thereby allowing a comparison with the modern theory of collusion. To proceed with the analysis of the optimal policy design, it is convenient to rewrite the critical loci found above in the space (p; ®) of policy parameters.
Firms would reveal if monitored if:
Firms would prefer to collude rather than deviate, when they anticipate that the opening of an investigation would result in collusion broken down by revelations, if:
Finally, collusion arises in the case where¯rms anticipate that no revelation would occur after the opening of an investigation, if:
= ® NC (±; p; F ):
The three loci above allow to de¯ne, in the space of policy parameters, three regions associated with di®erent implementable allocations, in which¯rms do not collude (NC), collude and reveal if monitored (CR) and collude and do not reveal (CNR): We summarize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the supergame played by¯rms for given policy parameters and discount factor ± in the following proposition, which is the dual of The AA chooses (®; p; R) given the incentive compatibility constraints, summarized in Figure   2 .b and Proposition 3, in order to maximize a utilitarian welfare function in which¯nes are pure transfers. Let K = DW L=(1 ¡ ±) be the discounted sum of the deadweight loss DW L, which can be thought of as the net social bene¯t from ppreventing collusion Moreover, let W j be the present value of the welfare gain if the policy induces the equilibrium outcome j = N C; C R; C N R. Then we have,
It is useful to identify the (welfare) indi®erence curves for the policy problem in the (®; p) space:
if we do not introduce¯ne reductions, in all the region A NC we have full deterrence ex-ante and the associated welfare gains are K for all the policy parameters in the A NC region. In the region A CNR the indi®erence curve for a level of welfare gains W CNR is ® = W CNR (1 ¡ ±)=(pK ¡ ±W CNR ), i.e. it is a decreasing and convex curve in the (®; p) space: ex{post desistence in this case depends on both ® and p according to the trade{o® described by the curve. Moreover, it is easy to show that the indi®erence curves in the A CNR region have a shape similar to the ® NC curve as de¯ned in ( 7), which is the upper boundary of that region, and in the limit they overlap with that curve. In fact, if we consider the indi®erence curves for given W CNR and the ® NC (p) curve which is the upper boundary of the A CNR region and equate them we obtain after rearranging:
The right hand side expression corresponds to the upper intercept of the ® NC (p) curve at ® = 1, Figure 3 . Notice that, constructing E CNR , we have excluded those points on the indi®erence curves in the A CNR region which are dominated by a combination of policy parameters in (at the boundary of) the A CR region, obtaining a convex set of policy parameters.
We can now analyze the optimal policies. According to the values of B; w ® and w p , i.e. the position of the budget constraint B = w ® ® + w p p in the (®; p) space, we can have di®erent solutions to the optimal policy problem. ² If the budget constraint is tangent to an indi®erence curve in the E CNR region de¯ned above, the optimal policy implements a CNR outcome; otherwise CR is the equilibrium outcome.
Proof:
See Appendix. Proposition 4 gives the conditions which in general allow to identify the optimal policies for given budget constraint and it de¯nes three sets of policy parameters which correspond to the di®erent equilibrium outcomes, as represented in Figure 3 . It is useful to consider the sequence of policy regimes that are associated with lower and lower budget constraints. Notice that two possibile sequences can arise, according to the way in which the budget constraint shrinks: either we move from a NC to a CNR regime, if the budget constraint is initially very steep and the tangency point on the ® NC (p) curve which implements the NC outcome lies in the neighborhood of the E CNR region, or we have, for°atter budget constraints, a NC-CR-CNR sequence if the tangency point with the ® NC (p) curve is in its lower part. This latter case seems quite interesting and allows to get the intuition of the pros and cons of the Leniency Programs.
Consider the optimal policies for parallel shifts of the budget constraint; for a relatively high total endowment a NC outcome can be implemented at a tangency point with the ® NC (p) curve: in this case reduced¯nes would be harmful, inducing collusion (and revelation) when otherwise the AA would be able to prevent collusion. When the budget constraint shifts downwards and lies below the ) NC curve, it is no longer possible to obtain ex-ante deterrence of collusion. In this case it is optimal to implement a CR outcome by granting maximum¯ne discounts and setting the policy parameters along theF vertical locus: intuitively, when the AA is only able to implement ex-post desistence, reduced nes become appealing as a less costly way of proving and interrupting collusion. The implicit cost of such a policy is the need to sink resources in order to make independent prosecution a credible threat which induces revelation. As a consequence, when the total endowment is further reduced (the budget constraint shifts further downwards), fewer and fewer resources are left for general monitoring, which in the end determines the likelihood of interrupting collusion and the desirability of such a policy.
At some point, we¯nd that the (low) budget constraint becomes tangent to the iso{welfare curve in the -CNR region: it means that we obtain a higher expected welfare moving to the region wherē rms collude and do not reveal, abandoning the Leniency Program and changing the mix of policy parameters in a more favourable way.
Alternative Leniency Rules
In this section we adapt the model to alternative Leniency Rules that have been adopted in the recent experience in the US and in the European Union. The¯rst extension refers to the possibility of giving reduced¯nes only if¯rms reveal information before an inquiry is opened by the AA. Another regime assigns the reduction in¯nes only to the¯rst¯rm which o®ers cooperation with the agency. Next, we suggest that if only one speci¯c¯rm is entitled to bene¯t from a Leniency Program, this policy would be even more successful.
Fine reductions only before the inquiry is opened
As mentioned in the introduction, the initial Leniency Program introduced in the US in 19%8 entitled rms with a reduction in¯nes only if the cooperation started before an inquiry was opened. On the same line, the actual regime chosen in the EU with the July 1996 Notice is more favourable for¯rms who reveal information before the AA has opened an o±cial investigation. It is therefore interesting to analyze whether this rule can be justi¯ed in terms of enforcement e®ectiveness. We show that this is not the case.
Let us consider a \¯ne reductions only before an inquiry is opened" regime. The corresponding game structure is described for the general case of n¯rms in the following & : t > : if up to the previous period the AA has not started an investigation, the game restarts as from t = 2, etc. 9
Consider¯rst the subgame starting at t = 1 after a decision to collude. To¯nd the conditions under which not revealing is an equilibrium, we have to compare the payo® from revealing when the other¯rms do not reveal, namely ¦ N 1¡± ¡ R, with the payo® from not revealing when the other¯rms do not reveal. The latter is given by:
whence:
It is simple algebra to check that this payo® is higher than (p(
1¡± ), the expected payo® from not revealing after the investigation has been opened, which was the relevant one under the rule analyzed in the previous section. Since the payo® from revealing is the same in both cases, it follows that the equilibrium where¯rms do not reveal is more likely to occur when the Leniency Program is applied only for revelations before the inquiry is opened. In other words, the curve± moves to the right and collusion is less likely to be broken by revelations in this regime. This is hardly surprising, because the probability of the event \being found guilty and thus¯ned" is lower before seeing if the industry will be monitored than after an investigation is actually opened.
We have now to consider if the Leniency Program might change the ex{ante incentives of¯rms to collude. It turns out that there would never be collusion in the industry when¯rms expect that there would be revelation of information to the AA in the following period: this implies that an equilibrium in which¯rms choose to collude and reveal does not exist. In fact, by colluding when expecting the In the case, considered in the previous section, where¯rms were entitled to¯ne discounts =BJAH the opening of an investigation, the expected pro¯t from collusion decreases when the event \opening of an investigation" realizes, leading¯rms to reveal information to the agency. In the case we are considering here, instead, nothing new happens between the moment when the¯rms decide on collusion and the moment when they are asked to cooperate with the authorities to break down the cartel.
Our analysis reveals that if Leniency Programs are to be e®ective in breaking down cartels, they should be extended to bene¯t¯rms which reveal after the industry is put under monitoring. Since proving¯rms guilty of collusion is a very lengthy and complex issue, which does not always end up with the¯rms being condemned, a great amount of resources can be saved and a¯nal positive outcome guaranteed by ensuring that¯rms have the proper incentives to collaborate with the AA even after an investigation has been started. ' Allowing¯rms to choose whether to reveal or not before an investigation is opened at any period would not change the results.
This result is consistent with the US experience, where initially the Leniency Program was used only for¯rms which spontaneously o®ered evidence before the inquiry was opened by the AA. In this initial regime the program was quite ine®ective while, once allowed in 1993 for reduced¯nes even after the inquiry was opened, the number of cases in which¯rms cooperate with the judges increased signi¯cantly. In the 1994 Annual Report of the Antitrust Division it is stressed that in the¯rst year of the new regime \an average of one corporation per month come forward with information on unilateral conspiracies, compared to an average of one per year under the previous policy. The policy thus allowed the Division to extend the reach of its criminal enforcement activities with relatively little expenditure of resources" . According to our results, the new regulation on Leniency Programs adopted by the EU should be widened. The regulation states that¯rms which denounce a cartel before the Commission has opened an investigation are entitled to a reduction of 75{100% of the¯nes. Firms which denounce a cartel after that a \veri¯cation" has been opened are entitled to a 50{75% reduction of the¯nes, but only if those veri¯cations had not been fruitful and had not led to the opening of a procedure. Basically, this means that Leniency Programs are opened only for¯rms operating in industries which are not under the scrutiny of the AA. This narrows too much the scope of the application of the regulation, and fails to provide the¯rms with enough incentives for revealing information which can be useful to break the cartel.
Only the¯rst comer obtains a¯ne reduction
The criteria that determine which¯rms can receive the bene¯ts of a reduced¯ne have been restricted in di®erent ways both in the US and in the EU experience. An interesting case is where only the¯rst rm which o®ers evidence is given a¯ne reduction, as it is the case in the EU regulation.
In this case the game structure is the same as in our initial model. The only di®erence is that if all¯rms decide to reveal information to the judges, as it happens in a subgame perfect equilibrium in which¯rms reveal if monitored, the expected payo® becomes:
where n is the number of¯rms in the cartel: every¯rm is ex{ante the¯rst one to disclose information to the AA with probability 1=n. Notice, however, that when we check for the existence of an equilibrium in which no¯rm reveals, a deviating¯rm obtains the reduced¯ne R for sure, being the only one which cooperates with the judges. Hence, the condition for an equilibrium in which no¯rm reveals is ±¸±, exactly as in the case treated above. Taken literally, our analysis would also suggest that when¯rms reveal they should always receive a zero¯ne ( 4 = 0), since this would give them the greatest incentive to denounce the cartel. However, we are assuming that collaborating with the AA is a binary variable. Either one does not collaborate, or if it does it can give all the information necessary to prove the participation in the cartel of all the¯rms. In reality, the type of information that¯rms can provide would be more of a continuous variable, and tuning the¯ne reductions to the quality of the information revealed makes sense.
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Consider now the decision of¯rms on collusion at t = 1: if ±¸±¯rms will not reveal if monitored and everything is as in the basic model. However, if ± <±, revelation will follow the opening of an investigation, but¯rms' incentives to collude are modi¯ed in the present regime, since the expected payo® if monitored is lower than in the previous case where all¯rms could bene¯t from the Leniency Program.
One can check that¯rms will abstain from collusion i®
It is immediate to notice that ± +4 < ± 1 +4 , that is, the region of parameters that induce¯rms to abstain from collusion is larger than in the previous \all¯rms get the reduction" regime | see Figure 4 .
Figure 4 about here
The intuition of this result is as follows: in the more restrictive set of rules analyzed in this section, the expected reduction in¯nes is smaller when all¯rms choose to cooperate with the judges, although it is equivalent when we consider the incentive for a¯rm to cheat the partners when they do not reveal. Hence, when¯rms anticipate that they all will confess if monitored, they expect higher sanctions. Consequently, in some cases they¯nd it less attractive to collude and reveal as an alternative to deviating from the beginning and avoiding the¯ne. The regime therefore is able to partially reduce the ex{ante incentive to collusion without reducing the power of the program in making¯rms denounce a cartel after an inquiry is opened.
This case suggests an alternative rule which might increase the e®ectiveness of a Leniency Program, by further reducing the ex{ante incentive of engaging in collusion induced by the expected reduction in¯nes.
Only a speci¯c¯rm receives a¯ne reduction
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As we have repeatedly emphasized, a Leniency Program in°uences¯rms in two ways. The¯rst is that it stimulates ex{post breaking of the cartel via revelation of information to the AA; the second (adverse e®ect) is to increase the incentive of collusion via a reduction in the punishment in case of being found guilty. We have also seen that granting a reduction in¯nes only to the¯rst¯rm which reveals works because it leaves unchanged the¯rst e®ect but reduces the second. The e®ectiveness of the Leniency Program could be increased even further by increasing asymmetries in the industry and specifying ex{ante that only a speci¯c¯rm could be entitled to the LP, no matter the way in which such a¯rm is selected. The way of interpreting this rule is that of de¯ning ex{ante a set of parameters which allow all the participants in each speci¯c situation to identify a single¯rm entitled to a reduced ne " : the¯rms involved in the cartel, applying the rule, are able to work out which one will be thē rm selected. Denote this¯rm with a number, say 1. The conditions under which revelation occurs are the same as usual: If ± <±, the cartel would break because¯rm 1 denounces it. On the other ! We thank P. Rey for suggesting this extension.
"
For instance, it might be the¯rm located in the smallest city, or the last one in alphabetical order, etc.
hand, the conditions under which ex{ante collusion occurs will change. For the n ¡ 1¯rms which are not entitled to the Leniency Program, the condition for taking part in the collusion will be:
F CR (13) For¯rm 1, the condition is laxer:
However, since all the¯rms must¯nd it convenient to take part in collusion, the latter condition does not play any role, while the former is binding and determines the existence of collusion. Also, notice that ± F CR > ± I CR > ± CR | see Figure 4 . In other words, if the authority targets the Leniency
Program to a speci¯c¯rm, it will be able to reduce the ex{ante adverse e®ect of it without decreasing the ex{post incentive to reveal information. Hence, collusion becomes less likely because the¯rms excluded from the program¯nd it less appealing to engage in a cartel which includes a likely cheater # .
Heterogeneous Cartels
So far we have considered homogeneous cartels, in which the payo®s in each possible outcome were the same across partners. Notice however that, in all our arguments, if the participants have heterogenous payo®s and they know the payo®s of the partners in each possible outcome, the equilibria are governed by the conditions of one of the¯rms, the one whose constraints bind. This decisive agent is the point of reference for the others, whether they expect such¯rm to deviate or to reveal information after colluding, and drives the equilibrium conditions of the entire cartel. Hence, in a sense, our previous analysis allows to consider heterogeneous¯rms within a cartel, but it assumes that in each cartel in the economy such a decisive agent is always the same. It is therefore interesting to consider the case in which the cartels are truly heterogeneous, in the sense that the participants may di®er in payo®s and the decisive partner may be di®erent across cartels.
We consider in this setting the design of an optimal enforcement policy which cannot be made conditional on cartel's type, due to informational and/or institutional restrictions. Hence, the AA has to design a single, general policy facing many di®erent industries, characterized by heterogeneous market conditions and potential gains from collusion. In this case, the policy implemented will induce di®erent e®ects in the various industries, reaching a more or less e®ective deterrence of collusion and inducing di®erent types to choose di®erent reactions: hence we might have some cartel types colluding and not revealing while others will prefer not to join the cartel; or we might have all types colluding, but only a subset of them revealing information when monitored, etc. Hence, the di®erent e®ects that we have identi¯ed in the previous sections will be combined in a richer way once the AA faces heterogenous types.
From the previous analysis we already know that the incentive compatibility constraints for 1¡±+®± E(K) while in E all types abstain from collusion and welfare is W E = E(K). In region C some types choose CNR and others CR: let ¦ C M be the type whosẽ p equals the p chosen by the AA in region C: all types lower than ¦ C M collude and reveal while the cartels more pro¯table collude and don't reveal. The expected welfare is therefore The analysis of the optimal policy proceeds in three steps, which are developed analytically in the Appendix. First, the iso{welfare curves in each of the¯ve regions A{E are derived; then, we check how the same welfare level is obtained passing (eventually) from one region to the neighbouring one, distinguishing whether¯ne reductions are given or not;¯nally, comparing the two cases, it is selected whether reduced¯nes R allow to save enforcement costs, de¯ning a set of iso{welfare curves along which Leniency Programs are optimally used.
The result of this analysis is shown in¯gure 6.a: the lower bold curve is the iso{welfare (cost minimizing) curve setting R = 0, which passes through the regions A{C{B. The upper bold curve passing in the D{C{B regions entains the use of reduced¯nes only in a subset of the B and C regions.
The policy combinations (R; ®; p) which minimize the cost of reaching the same expected welfare are summarized in a map of iso{welfare curves which are not convex: as before, we have to convexify them excluding from the set of possible equilibrium outcomes those policy combinations which belong to the non{convex portions of the indi®erence curves.
Given the map of indi®erence curves that minimize the cost of a given expected welfare, we exclude those portions which can never be selected given our linear budget constraint ² If the budget constraint passes through region E, the optimal policy implements NC for all types at a tangency point between the budget constraint and the ® NC (p) curve of the highest type. ² If the budget constraint passes through region D and is tangent to an indi®erence curve in E NC CNR , the optimal policy is at the tangency point with no¯ne reduction, and implements a CNR{NC outcome according to the di®erent types.
² If the budget constraint passes through region A and is tangent to an indi®erence curve in E CNR , the optimal policy is at the tangency point and implements CNR for all types.
² If the budget constraint passes through C and is tangent to an indi®erence curve in E CR CNR , that is the optimal policy and implements a CNR-CR outcome.
² In all the other cases the optimal policy implements CR for all types setting p equal to thep of the highest type along the budget constraint. We can give an explanation of the result above considering the sequence of optimal policies when the budget constraint becomes steeper and steeper as a result of an increase in the cost of independent prosecution (higher M p ). For low values of M p the policy implements full deterrence ex{ante for all types. As the budget constraint rotates toward the origin we initially move to a CNR{NC mixed outcome with no¯ne reduction, in which the more pro¯table cartels are not deterred. Granting¯ne discounts in this case would shift low types from NC to CR: the pro{collusive e®ect of Leniency Programs would dominate reducing welfare. However, when the fraction of low types which choose NC shrinks further, reduced¯nes are introduced, inducing all types to collude and reveal. In this case the improvement in prosecution allowed by reduced¯nes becomes predominant. A further increase in M p moves the equilibrium outcome in the -CR CNR region with an increasing portion of high types that choose CNR while low types collude and reveal. The implicit cost of the Leniency Programs, which forces the AA to commit resources to independent prosecution to make it a credible threat, becomes heavier and heavier as the resources left to open inquiries decrease and as the fraction of types which are induced to reveal shrinks. In the end we move to the -CNR region, abandoning the Leniency Program. Hence, the optimal policy is determined, in a sense, by the relative importance of the pro{welfare e®ect of Leniency Program, that allows to obtain more e®ective ex{post desistence, and the welfare decreasing e®ects of reduced¯nes: the incentive to collude (and reveal) instead of abstaining from collusion, and the need to sink resources to make independent prosecution credible, which reduces the probability of opening an inquiry and of obtaining ex{post desistence.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the e®ects of Leniency Programs on the incentives of¯rms to collude and to reveal information that helps the Antitrust Authority to prove illegal behaviour. The benchmark regime gives to any¯rm a reduction in¯nes even if revelation occurs after an investigation is opened.
We show that reducing the expected¯nes may induce a pro{collusive reaction: combinations of policy parameters which, without Leniency Programs, would prevent collusion, may induce¯rms to collude (and reveal if monitored) when¯ne reductions are given. Hence, if the resources available to the AA are su±cient to prevent collusion using full¯nes, Leniency Programs should not be used.
However, when the AA has limited resources, Leniency Programs may be optimal in a second best perspective. Fine reductions, inducing¯rms to reveal information once an investigation is opened, increase the probability of ex{post desistence and the expected welfare gains. The optimal scheme requires maximum¯ne reductions and a shift of resources from prosecution to monitoring.
A¯xed amount of resources, however, must be committed in any case to make independent prosecution a credible threat, since no¯rm would reveal if it expects that the AA is unable to prove them guilty. When independent prosecution is very costly, too few resources are left to general monitoring, which in the end determines the e®ectiveness of Leniency Programs. In this case it may become more convenient to shift back to a full¯nes regime with a more favourable mix of policy parameters.
We have then compared our benchmark regime with alternative sets of rules: the¯rst allows to give¯ne reductions only to¯rms which cooperate with the Antitrust Authority before an inquiry is opened, as initially established in the US policy in 1978, and similar to the approach followed by the EC Notice on the non-imposition of¯nes, and we proved this regime to be inferior with respect to our benchmark case. We have then considered other rules which restrict the set of the¯rms that can bene¯t from a Leniency Program. We showed that by granting a¯ne reduction only to the¯rst rm which cooperates with the AA the perverse pro{collusive e®ect of the Leniency Program would be reduced without softening the incentives to reveal information. Better still, the AA might target a speci¯c¯rm and allow only this one to bene¯t from the reduction. The intuition for this result, which makes the Leniency Program even more e®ective, lies in the asymmetry that the policy introduces among otherwise identical¯rms, between the entitled¯rm and the excluded ones: the latter would more often prefer to abstain from collusion rather than join a cartel together with a likely cheater.
Finally, the case of multiple cartel types has been considered: the AA is assumed to be unable, for informational or institutional reasons, to implement Leniency Programs contingent on cartel's type, and therefore has to set general rules. For instance, the AA cannot shape the policy to the conditions of each speci¯c industry, but has to choose a general rule of behaviour, obtaining di®erent e®ects in di®erent industries. Then, according to the position of the budget constraint in the set of policy combinations, we characterized the optimal policy: it turns out that the policy parameters and the regime of full or reduced¯nes are chosen according to the relative weight of the three e®ects described above, where the weights depend on the share of types which choose the di®erent equilibrium outcomes (no collusion; collusion; collusion and revelation).
We believe that, despite the simple setting, our paper sheds some light on the desirable features of leniency programs, and suggests some changes in the EC leniency policy. First of all, if it is optimal to use a leniency program (as in the realistic case where the antitrust agency has limited resources), then the program should be as generous and certain as possible with the¯rms which provide fresh evidence that establishes the existence of a cartel. In contrast, the EC policy of keeping some degree of discretionality instead of granting automatic and total reduction of¯nes even to those¯rms which ful¯l all the (strict) conditions laid down in the EC Notice undermines the success of the leniency program, as it does not give certainty to the prospective cooperating¯rm and reduces the incentive to break the cartel.
Likewise, some of the conditions required by the EC policy are too strict. For instance, a¯rm must \maintain continuous and complete co{operation throughout the investigation" to be entitled to have a very substantial reduction (more than 75%) of the¯ne. This has led the Commission to give only a 50% reduction to a¯rm, Tate & Lyle, which had spontaneously brought conclusive evidence of a cartel to the attention of the Commission (at a time when the Commission did not even suspect the existence of an agreement), but had later (partially) contested some of the allegations made by the Commission % . The strict wording and application of the Notice will reduce the incentive of the¯rms to reveal information & .
Furthermore, our analysis indicates that a leniency program should be equally applicable to information disclosed before and after an investigation has started, whereas the EC policy does not % This is the case \British Sugar", EC Decision of 14 October 1998, published in the O±cial Journal of the EC, L76, 22 March 1999. & Hornsby and Hunter (1997) also point out that the¯rms do not have enough incentives to cooperate under the EC policy. Part of the problem is also due to the fact that the Notice cannot provide immunity from civil proceedings.
Admission of an infringement leads to a formal Commission Decision on which an action for damages can be built, without the plainti® having to prove the infringement again. This problem does not exist in the US, where the cooperating¯rms can resort to a consent decree.
' create enough incentives for post{investigation disclosure of information. It gives only 50{75% reduction of the¯nes for cooperation after an investigation has been undertaken already but only if such an investigation has failed to provide su±cient material for initiating a procedure leading to a decision.
The US experience (where after the 1993 policy revision a corporation is granted leniency after an investigation has begun provided that \the Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does not yet have evidence against the company that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction" | point B.2.) clearly shows that extension of the leniency program to post{investigation amnesty (along with the automatic granting of the amnesty) is a crucial ingredient for success: \...under the old policy on average only one corporation per year applied for amnesty," (Spratling (1998, page 2) whereas under the revised policy, \Amnesty applications over the past year have been coming in at the rate of approximately two per month" (Spratling (1999, page 2).
So far, the leniency program of the EC has been applied to a very reduced number of cases, since its introduction in the end of 1996. There was no case in 1997 and only four in 1998 ' . We believe that granting higher and automatic reductions of¯nes and extending the leniency program to after{investigation cooperation would greatly increase the success of this policy.
If a¯rm expects the others not to reveal, the best reply is trivially not to reveal if pF < R. If pF¸R, when the other¯rms don't reveal, a¯rm prefers not to reveal as well if the payo® above is higher than ¦ N =(1 ¡ ±) ¡ F , which simpli¯es to ±¸±(p; F; R). Hence, in this case a \no revelation" equilibrium exists. Moreover, the same inequality implies that the \no revelation" equilibrium gives higher payo®s to all¯rms than the \revelation" equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
We consider the decision to collude or deviate in both cases, when¯rm will decide to reveal if investigated, and when they will prefer not to cooperate with the AA. ² Case 1: ± <±. In this case¯rms reveal if an investigation is opened by the AA. De¯ne ¦ R as the expected pro¯t immediately before an investigation is opened. It is easy to see that:
from which we obtain:
If a¯rm decides to set the collusive price, then its expected discounted payo® will be:
If instead a¯rm decides to deviate from the collusive strategy, then its payo® is given by:
² Case 2: ±¸±. In this case,¯rms anticipate that even if an investigation is started, no¯rm will reveal any information. Collusive outcome will be obtained unless the AA can prove the¯rms guilty of collusion.
Write the expected pro¯t immediately before knowing if an investigation is opened as:
We can then obtain:
If a¯rm follows the collusive strategy its expected discounted payo® is given by:
As before, a¯rm which deviates obtains a payo®:
The inequality V CNR¸VD implicitly de¯nes the locus of points ± NC = ± NC (®; p; F ).
Proof of Proposition 4
We proceed in two steps:¯rst we show, for each given outcome NC, CR, CNR, which is the associated optimal policy; second, we show the conditions under which a particular outcome is better than the others. If a NC outcome is implemented, we can have two cases: either the budget constraint is above the lower boundary of the A NC region or it is tangent: in the latter case the tangency point with the ® NC curve is trivially the optimal solution; if the budget constraint is above that curve, the tangency point can still be suggested under a cost saving argument. In this case we set R = F since granting¯ne discounts would shrink the A NC region. If a CR outcome is implemented, the welfare gain depends only on ®, which therefore must be maximized: we can therefore set R = 0, shifting to the left thep threshold, and setting p =p; with p at its lowest level in the A CR region we can set ® = B=w ® ¡ (w p =w ® )p along the budget constraint. Finally if a CNR outcome is chosen, a tangency point between the budget constraint and the indi®erence curve in the A CNR region must be chosen.
Consider now the choice among the three outcomes: since W NC is always dominant for any set of policy parameters, if the budget constraint is not below the ® NC (p) curve, NC is the optimal outcome implemented. The choice between a CR and a CNR outcome is more complex, since both W CNR and W CR depend on the associated policy parameters, which, in turn, are di®erent at the optimal points in the two regimes. Suppose the tangency point in the A CNR region belongs to the subset E CNR : from the de¯nition of E CNR , even if the budget constraint in its lower portion reaches the A CR region, it passes through indi®erence curves lower than the initial one: hence, picking the tangency point in the E CNR region and implementing a CNR outcome is the optimal policy. On the contrary, if the tangency point is in A CNR but not in E CNR , the budget constraint reaches the A CR at a higher indi®erence curve, and a CR outcome is optimal.
The iso{welfare curves with heterogeneous cartel types
In the following three Lemmas we identify the iso{welfare curves when the AA faces heterogeneous cartels.
Lemma $ The iso{welfare curves in each of the¯ve regions have the following pattern:
² in E all the policy combination give the same welfare; ² in A and D they replicate the shape of the ® NC p curves; ² in B they are horizontal; ! ² in C they are decreasing; Proof:
Since W E does not depend on the policy parameters, all the region correspond to the same expected welfare. In region A all types choose CNR. From our analysis of the single type case we already know that the iso{welfare curves when no type colludes have a shape similar to the ® NC curves (one for each type) and in the limit overlap with those. Hence, in region A the indi®erence curves replicate the ® NC curves shape. In region D high types choose CNR and lower types choose NC: as long as we move along the ® NC curve of type ¦ D N , the threshold type does not change and thē rst term in W D is unchanged as well; moreover, we know that moving along a ® NC curve we keep the expected welfare for types choosing CNR constant. We conclude that the indi®erence curves in region D correspond to the ® NC curves through it. In region B all types choose CR and the expected welfare depends only on ®, i.e. we have°at iso{welfare curves. Finally, in the C region high types select CNR and low types CR: since W C increases when ® is higher (more frequent revelation) as well as when p increases (more e®ective prosecution and more types induced to reveal), the iso{welfare curve in the C region must be decreasing.
Notice that when no Leniency Program is used, only the regions A, D and E exist, and the result above states that all the curves in A (or D) never pass through another region. Hence, the three relevant sets of indi®erence curves are completely de¯ned. When R < F all the¯ve regions A{E exist; the Lemma above de¯nes the iso{welfare curves in each region, but now the iso{welfare curves in A (D) eventually continue through region C and B. Hence, we have to carefully check how the iso{welfare curves behave moving from one region to the other.
Lemma 7 Consider the case R < F. The iso{welfare curves passing through the regions A{C{B are continous and kinked at the boundaries of the A and B regions. The iso{welfare curves passing through the region D{C{B discountinously shift to the right passing from D to C.
Proof:
We start by identifying the indi®erence curves that pass through the A{C{B regions.
We already know, borrowing from the analysis of the single type case, that the iso{welfare curve jumps down from A to B, when all types choose CNR and then CR: however, from the de¯nitions of the expected welfare we can notice that W C tends to W A or W B as the threshold type ¦ C M tends to ¦ M or ¦ M . Hence, the indi®erence curves are now continuous; it is easy to check also that they are kinked at the boundaries of the A and B regions, with the indi®erence curve steeper in C than in the other two regions ! .
Consider next the indi®erence curves passing through the D{C{B regions: we already established that in D the curves replicate the ® NC curves shape, with some types choosing CNR and others NC; once moving into the C regions, some types still select CNR while others CR. Since the welfare associated to NC is higher than that when CR occurs, it must be that, moving from region D to region C along a iso{welfare curve, less types choose CNR. That requires a discontinuous jump to the right of the iso{welfare curve once entering in the C region.
!
The concavity or convexity of the indi®erence curve in C cannot be stated in general, since it depends on the distribution of types C(¦M ) . In what follows we consider the case of concave indi®erence curves, while the extension to the convex case is left to the reader.
" Figure 6 .a shows the two cases of indi®erence curves, one through A{C{B and the other through D{C{B. In the two Lemmas above we have completely characterized the iso{welfare curves when a Leniency Program is introduced and when it is not. Our next step is to verify when it is convenient to o®er reduced¯nes in order to reach a certain expected welfare. This exercise correponds to comparing the iso{welfare curves in the two cases, selecting in the di®erent regions the lower one. Lemma 8 When the iso{welfare curve with 4 = 0 passes through the A{C{B regions, it is always optimal to use the leniency Programs. When the iso{welfare curve with 4 = 0 lies in the D{C{B region, the Leniency Programs are optimal only in a subset of the C and B regions.
Proof:
Since 4 = 0 is the more e®ective way of inducing CR, we compare the case 4 = .
and 4 = 0, selecting the lower of the two iso{welfare curves. Since in A and D the iso{welfare curves are the same in both regimes, our problem amounts to selecting the lower curve in regions C and B.
This can be done by distinguishing the case in which the indi®erence curve with¯ne reduction passes through the A{C{B region and that in which it lies in the D{C{B areas. Comparing the full and reduced¯nes indi®erence curves is immediate for the A{C{B case: in the A region they overlap while in the C and B region the iso{welfare curve is lower when 4 = 0, as shown in¯gure 6.a. Hence, the iso{welfare curve through A{C{B is that identi¯ed when the Leniency Program is used.
More complex is the comparison of the indi®erence curves with and without¯ne reductions when the former passes through the D{C{B region. In this case, in fact, the iso{welfare curve with¯ne reductions jumps to the right entering the C region, while with no Leniency Program the indi®erence curve, which is the same as before in the D area, goes on smoothly in the C region ! . Hence, entering the C region from the top, the lower indi®erence curve is initially the one associated with no¯ne reduction. It may happen, as shown in¯gure 6.a, that continuing along it, the indi®erence curve with¯ne reductions becomes the lower one for a while. Finally, moving further to the right, the indi®erence curve with full¯nes lies again below that with¯ne reductions. For higher levels of the expected welfare, the indi®erence curve with full¯nes always dominates that with reduced¯nes.
Hence, when we consider the indi®erence curves for increasing value of the expected welfare, as long as we are in the A{C{B region we use Leniency Programs, while entering the D{C{B region we adopt reduced¯nes only with a subset of policy parameters (®; p), as shown in¯gure 6.a. 
